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Financial Institution Merger Enforcement:
The Historical Context
by Don Allen Resnikoff

Introduction
This Article discusses past
government merger enforcement and
bank regulation relevant to financial
institution mergers, focusing on hotly
contested policy debates. Such past
debates provide insight into the future
course of bank merger regulation if for
no reason other than that new debates
may be similar to the old. Political
sentiments hostile to large financial
institutions dominate these past
debates, and may continue to do so in
the future.
The first part of this Article will
provide a brief overview of recent
governmental agency and
Congressional activity and financial
institution mergers. This Article will
next discuss the great debate of
antitrust merger policy of past decades:
whether merger enforcement should be
a political tool to be used against big
business, or a means of assuring
economic efficiency. The third part of
this Article briefly considers the history
of American regulation of financial
institutions, which frequently included
controversial policies devised by
politicians reacting to public antipathy
to large financial institutions. This
Article continues by taking up the
debate concerning the federal
government's aid to large and troubled
financial institutions considered "too
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big to fail." Such government aid has
occasionally put a burden on
taxpayers, and aroused public concern.
Finally, this article concludes that old
policy debates over political antipathy
to large business entities are sure to
rise again.
An overview of recent
governmental agency and
Congressional activity
and financial institution mergers
Several federal agencies review
financial institution mergers. Review
standards applied by the Antitrust
Division of the U.S. Department of
Justice are contained in the generally
applicable Merger Guidelines issued
jointly by the Antitrust Division and
the Federal Trade Commission. Bank
Merger Screening Guidelines, issued
by the Antitrust Division of the U.S.
Department of Justice, The Federal
Reserve Board and the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, clarify the
agencies' processes and, in a single
document, set out the ground rules for
the agencies' review of mergers.' The
federal agencies can challenge those
mergers perceived as threatening
competitive harm and do, in fact,
challenge a small percentage. State's
Attorney Generals may also have
authority to challenge bank mergers.
Congressional legislation affecting
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financial institutions includes the
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994,3
("Riegle-Neal Act"), which provides
that national banks and authorized
state banks are able to branch
nationwide, except in states that opted
out of interstate branching.4 Thus, the
Reigle-Neal Act permits banks to
operate throughout the country,
something non-bank financial
institutions have always been able to
do.
Much Congressional effort has been
directed to the repeal of statutes dating
from the Great Depression that
prohibit banks from commercial
activities such as sales of securities and
insurance. This effort has, for the most
part, been unsuccessful. The target of
the repeal effort is the Glass-Steagall
Act, which sharply limits the types of
business banks can conduct. For
example, securities underwriting by
5
banks is constrained by the Act.
The stated purpose of the GlassSteagall Act is to provide for the safety
and more effective use of the funds
provided to banks by the Federal
Reserve system and to prevent the
undue diversion of bank funds into
speculative business investment. The
Act's separation of banking and other
business activity has been weakened
by regulatory agencies over the years.
Recent Federal Reserve and Comptroller
of the Currency announcements
further liberalize bank participation in
6
the securities industry.
Congress recently considered bills
repealing the Glass-Steagall Act and
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expanding the business banks can do.
However, as of May, 1998
Congressional efforts were at
stalemate, with banking interests
unable to work out a compromise with
securities and insurance business
7
interests trying to protect their turf.
Consumer groups and small thrifts also
oppose the proposed legislation.8
However, commentators suggest that
legislation repealing the Glass-Steagall
Act and expanding bank businesses
will pass some time in the next few
years. 9
Against this backdrop of government
agency merger enforcement and
Congressional activity, some
commentators believe large financial
institution mergers are beneficial. 10
Recent Congressional legislation
permitting interstate branching is one
cause of an increase in merger acivity,
as mergers provide a way for banks
that develop interstate operations to
show greater earnings." A reason for
recent mergers of multiregional banks
is that governmental merger
enforcement tends not to penalize
merger partners simply because they
are multiregional: relevant markets are
generally local for the purpose of
antitrust analysis. A merger partner's
broad geographic reach is largely
irrelevant to analysis of the effects of a
12
merger in any particular locality.
Some commentators believe repeal of
the Glass-Steagall Act will also
encourage merger activity. Repeal
would reduce regulation by limiting
banks to traditional businesses. Banks
will be able to engage in a variety of
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financial service activities, such as
securities and insurance marketing.
Financial institutions that are not
chartered as banks will also be in these
businesses. Now artificially
fragmented markets for banking,
securities underwriting, and insurance
may converge. Various financial
service institutions will provide an
integrated array of financial services
and have nationwide scope. The size
of these financial institutions could
become quite large, and their number
few, as a result of merger activity.
Author Martin Mayer envisions
"nationwide or nearly nationwide
institutions, certainly no more than
twenty of them. Some of these
institutions will be banks, some will be
brokerage houses, some will be data
processors .... These nationwide
institutions will be what the retail trade
calls 'category killers.' 13 The CitibankTravelers's merger, combining banking
and insurance powerhouses, adds
14
weight to Martin Mayer's vision.
How "big is bad" merger
enforcement gave way to efficiency
oriented enforcement
Antitrust law does not fit easily into
the orthodox mold of law as a science
of universal and immutable principles.
That view of law, associated with turn
of the century Harvard Law Dean
Christopher Langdell and traditional
Socratic law school teaching, has given
way to a more realistic and goal
oriented antitrust jurisprudence'"
Antitrust law is fluid and has evolved
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dramatically in recent years.
Post-World War II antitrust
enforcement was suspicious of
businesses with large market share.
This suspicion, however, went beyond
pure economics and included a fear of
the the political power and social
leadership of large market share
businesses. 16 Anti-big business
suspicion may have come from
experience with business cartels
associated with harsh World War II
governments in Germany and Japan.
The domestic political struggles that
led to the New Deal policies of the
1930's may have also influenced postwar federal antitrust enforcers. In
1959, Karl Kaysen and Donald Turner
theorized the then-current goals of
federal antitrust enforcement:
The goal of a 'proper' distribution
of power, [including political
power and general social
leadership], between large and
small business is rationalized in
terms of certain Jeffersonian
symbols of wide political appeal
and great persistence in American
life: business units are politically
irresponsible, and therefore large
powerful business units are
dangerous. [When it passed the
Sherman Antitrust Act, Congress]
desired to protect equal access and
equal opportunity for small
business for noneconomic reasons:
concentration of resources in the
hands of a few was viewed as a
social and political catastrophe ...
In 1945, in United States v. Aluminum
Company of America, 8 Judge Learned
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Hand wrote,"[w]e have been speaking
only of the economic reasons which
forbid monopoly; but, as we have
already implied, there are others, based
on the belief that great industrial
consolidations are inherently undesirable,
regardless of their economic results." 9
Congress amended the antitrust laws
in 1950 to include the Clayton Antitrust
Act in an effort to plug the dike against
a perceived rising tide of industrial
mergers. Clayton Act Section 7
prohibits acquisition of stock or assets
"where in any line of commerce or any
activity affecting commerce in any
section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may... be substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create
2°
a monopoly."
Merger cases brought by the United
States governement in the 1950s and
1960s frequently involved companies
which had relatively small shares of
properly defined markets, and where
anticompetitive effects were obscure.
For various reasons, the Government's
opposition to the mergers generally
prevailed in the courts. Justice Stewart
quipped in a now famous dissenting
opinion, "The sole consistency I can
find is that in [merger] litigation under
Section 7 [of the Clayton Act], the
Government always wins."21
Perhaps the most noted bank merger
case of the 1960s was United States v.
PhiladelphiaNational Bank. 22 In blocking
the merger, the Supreme Court relied
heavily on broad policy considerations.
The Court did offer economic analysis
of market power in a defined product
and geographic area, although the
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analysis does not meet today's rigorous
standards. 23
The PhiladelphiaBank Court's
economic analysis found that merger
prospects Philadelphia National Bank
and Girard Trust were the second and
third largest regional banks based on
such criteria as deposits, assets, and
loans. The Court accepted the
Government's evidence that the
relevant product market was
"commercial banking," including
various kinds of services, and that a
four county metropolitan area was the
relevant geographic area for determining
market power. The Court found that
merger would leave a single bank
controlling 30% of commercial
banking. The Court discounted
evidence that the merger would have
no significant competitive effects, and
put great weight on the 30% market
share figure. 24
The Court cited Brown Shoe v. United
States25 case for the proposition that
"Congressional concern with the trend
toward concentration [evidenced in
Clayton Act Section 7] warrants
dispensing, in certain cases [involving
large market share], with elaborate
proof of market structure, market
behavior, or probable anticompetitive
effects."26 The Court said that the high
market share percentages presented an
"inherently anticompetitive tendency."'
PhiladelphiaBank further refused to
rationalize the anticompetitive merger
on the basis of an alleged benefit to
consumers, observing that Congress, in
enacting the Clayton Act, barred
"anticompetitive mergers, benign and
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malignant alike..."28
unnecessary interference with that
The late 1970s and early 1980s, critics larger universe of mergers that are
stepped forward to attack a process of
either competitively beneficial or
federal antitrust enforcement, and
neutral." The 1982 Guidelines, along
judicial reasoning, that relied less and
with subsequent versions, provide
less upon pure market-share analysis.
detailed formula for determining when
Richard Posner, among others,
a merger will create anticompetitive
proclaimed the science of economics as market power. The 1982 Guidelines
the antidote to "big is bad"
provided forumla for determining,
prosecutions. "The antitrust field is in
among other things, product and
need of a thorough rethinking. [To the geographic market, potential for
extent that
anticompetitive
efficiency is the goal
effects, and relevant
of antitrust
The Antitrus1 Division efficiencies.3"
enforcement...
Some aspects of the
[there is no]
Department of
currently analyzes
justification for
particularpt'0'duct
Justice's current bank
using the antitrust
merger analysis differ
h as loans
markedly from the
suc,
markets,
laws to attain goals

small busi esses, and

unrelated or

to

antithetical to

determines the relevant

market share driven
analysis of Philadelphia
Bank.31 The Antitrust
efficiency, such as
promoting a society
geographicn arketfor
Division currently
of small
each such p luct.
analyzes particular
tradespeople. 2 9
product markets, such
as loans to small
William Baxter, the first U.S. Assistant businesses, and determines the
Attorney General in charge of antitrust
relevant geographic market for each
enfurcement under President Ronald
such product. The Division focuses on
Reagan, heeded the calls for a new
particular customer groups, and has,
enforcement grounded in efficiency
for example, evaluated "the potential
based economics. Baxter, himself the
effect of bank mergers on middleauthor of learned articles on economics market banking customers. Such
and antitrust, in 1982 initiated
customers have banking needs that are
Antitrust Division Merger Guidelines
different from small businesses." 32 The
which were significantly different from Division then "look[s] at the possibility
the Guidelines the agency had issued
of entry and expansion." The overall
in 1968. The 1982 Guidelines attempted goal is to prevent "anticompetitive
to balance the Congressional mandate
effects from bank mergers, . . . while at
to interdict competitive problems in
the same time permitting most of the
their incipiency with a desire to "avoid efficiencies associated with those
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mergers." 33 To this end, the ultimate
test is if, or how, different classes of
consumers might be harmed by the
proposed bank merger. Examples of
such consumer injuries include higher
interest rates, or even a lack of
available funds from banks in the
given community.3'
Some commentators suggest that
efficiency-oriented economic analysis,
as a source of deductive reasoning by
courts, continues to evolve. This
evolution, is the heart of the transition
from "Chicago school" antitrust
enforcement to "post-Chicago school"
antitrust economics. The older
Chicago school style may have tended
to be rigidly deductive, while the
newer economic style leaves more
opening for analysis of the particular
facts of each case?A brief look at the history of bank
regulation and the role of political
opposition to large financial
institutions
Regulation of financial institutions in
the United States has a unique political
history. Persistent public opposition to
great banking power has had the
important effect of crating a central
bank system that is weaker than that of
other major countries, and producing a
more fragmented system of financial
institutions.
Politicians colorfully expressed their
opposition to big banking interests as
early in the American Republic as
Jefferson's presidency 36 and the
Jacksonian period.37 Popular
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discontent with banking influenced
development of the country's banking
structure.38 The first Bank of the
United States was formed through the
efforts of Alexander Hamilton in 1791,
but Congress refused to renew its
charter in 1811.39 The second Bank of
the United States was established in
1817, but in 1832 Andrew Jackson
vetoed legislation to give the bank a
new charter. "Jackson's belief in state's
rights, his concern for agrarian issues,
and his distrust of banks in general and
the economically and politically
powerful Bank of the United States in
particular had predisposed him to
oppose the bank...,,40
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 gave
the United States an imperfect central
bank:
While the Federal Reserve Act was
a step in the right direction, it
contained flaws that were largely
a result of the political
compromises that had to be made
to get any central bank at all.
Regional interests opposed
establishing a single central bank,
such as existed in other
industrialized nations, and states'
righters resisted a substantial
federal presence in the affairs of
the central bank. These groups
feared that a central bank would
be controlled by the interests of
Wall Street or Washington D.C.4'
The Great Depression of the 1930s
tested the abilities of the Federal
Reserve System, which performed
poorly.42 The result was a revamping
of the regulatory structure of banking.43
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The revamped structure provided the
banker's "safety net" that provided
federal insurance for bank depositors,
limited the scope of bank activities,
and protected banks from competitive
forces."
Certainly political pressures
prompted legislative action during the
Great Depression. An interaction
between popular discontent and
political action is described in Robert
Litan's retelling of the story of how the
Glass-Steagall Act was passed. 45
Senator Glass repeatedly proposed that
Congress pass legislation to separate
commercial and investment banking.
He was unsuccessful until 1933, when
the political climate had changed, in
part because Senator Glass held
Congressional hearings revealing
various abuses by banks and their
securities affiliates. The hearings
helped "fan public sentiment against
the banking community, which not
surprisingly intensified as the bank
failure rate accelerated into 1933."4
Thus the Glass-Steagall proposal
became part of the legislative package
passed to rescue the banking system.
Congress's adoption of the Clayton
Act in 1950 was directed at the
perceived problem of business mergers
generally, not just bank mergers. The
passage of the Act reflected the
continuing political pressures concerning
mergers of large businesses.
The federal bail-out of savings and
loans and commercial banks in the
1970's and 1980's dearly caught the
attention of the public and became a
political issue. There is a likely
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connection between public concern
and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvements Act of
1991, which established more rigorous
regulation of banks, and the 1994
federal legislation which limited
Government bail-out of banks beyond
paying off insured depositors.47
In short, there is a rich American
history of political hostility toward
large financial institutions, leading to
legislative and regulatory limits on
banking, often of arguable merit.
Banks "too big to fail"
It is useful to tease out from the
broad story of financial institution
regulation the narrower story of
government rescues of floundering
banks considered "too big to fail."
These rescues have imposed costs on
the taxpayers, and are an example of
government action having a politically
significant tendency to arouse public
ire toward large financial institutions.
Government aid to troubled banks
may be viewed as in two categories;
payment to depositors within the
stated per-deposit federal deposit
insurance limit (currently $100
thousand), and aid beyond that limit."
In 1994 Congress enacted legislation
stating that Government bail-out of
banks should restricted to paying the
losses of insured depositors to the
extent of the prescribed $100,000
payment limit.49 Nevertheless, in the
past government regulators have felt a
need to aid troubled banks beyond the
prescribed insurance limits and
uninsured deposits were treated as if
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insured. It is a matter of debate
whether the 1994 statute will preclude
extraordinary aid in the future. If
Congress and the regulatory agencies
believe that particular large financial
institution failures threaten the stability
of the economy, arguably means could
be found to save the "too big to fail"
institutions. Indeed, some critics think
the U.S. Government has recently been
too quick to come to the aid of large
U.S. banks that made unfortunate
investments in the Asian markets.5o
Among the "too big to fail" banks
that the Government bailed out in the
past was Continental Illinois. That bail
out reportedly caused the FDIC a loss
of $1.7 billion in 1984.51 In 1988, the
FDIC rescued the nation's 13th largest
bank holding company, First Republic
Bank Corp., in a package reportedly
worth $5 billion.5 2
In Th BANKERs: TE NExT GENERATION,
Martin Mayer provides an account of
U.S. Government "too big to fail"
policies.-s He explains that financial
problems hit commercial banks in the
late 1980s because, like the savings and
loans before them, banks face a long
term decline in their ability to compete.
Banks have reduced ability to control
low interest deposits as a source of
capital, and a reduced ability to
compete profitably with non-bank
sources of capital. As a result the sense
developed that commercial banks were
in a precarious situation.'
According to Mayer, the
government's solution for the large
commercial banks' predicament
included some direct bailout activity
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and promotion of mergers that reduced
the number and capacity of banks.'
Mayer concludes that "by keeping the
big banks alive to buy each other out
after the government had restored
them to profitability, the Fed achieved
the necessary results with the least
shock to the system."5 6 This is not to
say that the solution was without costs
to taxpayers. The most obvious was
the direct cost to the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, ("FDIC").
Absorbing the losses of one bank alone,
First Republic, eventually cost the
FDIC $3 billion. Additional taxpayer
burden took the form of special tax
breaks provided to facilitate the quiet
absorption of First Republic into
another bank by merger.
Conclusion: The significance of
political antipathy toward large
financial institutions
Past bank regulation and merger
enforcement policy was to some extent
influenced by political debate
involving public hostility to large
financial insitutions. The extent to
which such public concerns will be
relevant in the future is a matter of
speculation, but review of the daily
press suggests that there is already
some escalation of political debate
based on public concerns. The
consequences of significant escalation
could include reducing the influence of
economic analysis while increasing
emphasis on broad political issues are
brought into play. Policy debates could
reopen between advocates of broadly
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based "big is bad" political thinking
and advocates of economic efficiency.
That political give and take affects
merger policy is a simple point, but it is
an important one. Policy makers will
need to deal actively with antipathy
toward large financial institutions as a
political issue. A lesson from the past
drawn by some observers is that
politicians' reaction to public hostility
to large financial institutions has often
been demagogic, leading to less than
optimal public policy 58 Hopefully
there will be no such dire consequences
in the future, and excellent policies
serving the public interest will prevail.

Endnotes
1
See Constance K. Robinson, Bank
Mergers and Antitrust, Address Before the
31st Annual Banking Law Institute (May 30,
1996) [hereinafter Robinson1].
"The Division has been
extraordinarily active in this [bank merger]
area, dealing with the unprecedented merger
wave, which has included a large number of
very large bank mergers. During Fiscal Year
1995, the Division screened almost 1,900
bank mergers, and issued 1,211 competitive
factor reports, and so far in 1996, we have
screened 1,659 mergers and issued 1,096
competitive factor reports. In 1995, we
required divestitures in five cases. So far in
1996, we have required divestitures in six
cases." Constance K. Robinson, Bank
Mergers and Antitrust, Address Before the
Association of the Bar of the City of New
York (Sept. 30, 1996) [hereinafter Robinson2].
2

Reigle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, 108 STAT.
2338 (1994) (codified as amended in
3.
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scattered sections of Title 12, United States
Code).
See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1994).
See 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 24, 78, 221, 335,
377, 378(a) (West Supp. 1998). 12 U.S.C.A. §
24 provides, "The business of dealing in
securities and stock by the association shall
be limited to purchasing and selling such
securities and stock without recourse, solely
upon the order, and for the account of,
customers, and in no case for its own
account, and the association shall not
underwrite any issue of securities or
5

stock..." 12 U.S.C.A. § 78 provides, with

certain exceptions, "No officer, director, or
employee of any corporation or
unincorporated association, no partner or
employee of any partnership, and no
individual, primarily engaged in the issue,
flotation, underwriting, public sale, or
distribution, at wholesale or retail, or
through syndicate participation, of stocks,
bonds, or other similar securities, shall serve
at the same time as an officer, director, or
employee of any member bank...." 12

U.S.C.A. § 377 makes the provisions of 12
U.S.C.A. § 24 applicable to state bank
members of the Federal Reserve System.
Participants in the securities business are
ineligible to participate in banking. See 12
U.S.C.A. § 378(a).
Glass-Steagall is supplemented by the
Bank Holding Company Act, which
prohibits bank holding companies or their
non-bank subsidiaries from many non-bank
activities. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(c)(8)(West
Supp. 1998). The Bank Holding Company
Act was amended in 1970 to close a loophole
in the Act that seemed to permit a special
one-bank category of holding companies the
power to engage in securities dealings.
Congress closed this apparent loophole by
means of the Bank Holding Company
Amendments Act of 1970, which instructed
the Federal Reserve Board to limit bank
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banking activities. This Congressional
instruction is found at 12 U.S.C.A. §
1843(c)(8). The Federal Reserve's
implementation of the loophole closing
legislation is called Regulation Y.
In October 1996, the Fed issued
regulations continuing a policy of removing
restrictions on the activities between a firm
engaged in securities underwriting and
dealing covered under Section 20 of the
Glass Steagall Act and an affiliated state
member bank. The Fed also raised the limit
on bank securities activities to 25 percent of
revenue in their securities affiliates from 10
percent previously allowed. In November
1996, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency ("OCC") similarly revised its
regulations concerning operating
subsidiaries of national banks. The OCC
now permits national banks to use their own
subsidiaries to underwrite and deal in
securities.

would update 'increasingly antiquated laws
that constrain the development and
competitiveness of our financial system."'
Peter Pae, Bank Lobby Opposes Reform Bill;
ABA Stance Another Setback for GOP Plan to
Revamp Finance Laws, WASH. PosT, March 26,
1998, at C03.
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Recent Republican sponsored
compromise legislation displeased banking
interests. The American Bankers Association
("ABA"), which represents 90 percent of the
nation's banks, said it could not support a
compromise bill offered by House
Republican leaders. The ABA's view was
that the bill would burden the banking
industry with unnecessary regulation.
Banking interests considered the legislation
too protective of securities and insurance
business interests. The Clinton
Administration opposed the Republican
compromise proposal, while Fed chief Alan
Greenspan supported it. "Treasury Secretary
Robert E. Rubin, in a letter to House Speaker
Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) last week, said the
Clinton administration opposes [the
proposal before Congress in April] because it
would harm national banks and thrifts. But
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan
endorsed the plan a day later, saying it
7
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"The ABA join[ed] a powerful
coalition of thrifts, community bankers and
consumer groups in opposing the bill, albeit
for different reasons. The thrift industry
[was] against it because the bill would block
corporations from gaining thrift charters.
Consumer groups said allowing banks to sell
insurance and investment products would
create a situation 'ripe for abuse."' Id.
8

"The ABA opposition will slow it
[Glass-Steagall reform legislation] down a
bit, but it's hard to tell by how much,' said
Robert Litan, director of economic studies at
the Brookings Institution." Id. While
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John M. Morris, a Citicorp spokesman said
"the odds are very strong that the laws are
going to change." Richard Stevenson,
Shaping a Colossus: The Regulators; Financial
Heavyweights Try Do-It-Yourself Deregulation,
N.Y. TIvEs, Apr. 7, 1998, at Al (quoting John
M. Morris).
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The market has generally been
receptive to these large [merger]
transactions, and seems to accept the
proposition that size can provide
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synergies by eliminating excess
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enhancements through cross-selling a
broader product line, and manage the
sizeable investments in technology
needed to maintain a competitive
advantage. Buoyed by a strong stock
market and a rise in acquiror market
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Chapter 5 discusses law and economics
generally. See id. at 83-105.
CENTURY'S END

16

See CARL CAYSEN & DONALD F.

TURNER,

ANTTRUST PoLIcy: AN EcONOMNc AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS

17-19 (1959).

17

Id.

18

148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).

19

Id. at 428.

20

15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (West 1997).

11

U2
According to Richard Maroney, a
bank consultant, the Justice Department and
Federal Reserve will focus on a "a specific
banking market or banking markets because
the entire state of Louisiana is not a banking
market. They'll look at Monroe or Baton
Rouge or New Orleans... on a market-bymarket basis." Dennis Canire, How Agencies
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conglomeration of products and a broad
geographic area to define a market. See
Merger Guidelines, supra note 23, at 11-99 - 11126.
Z5

370 U.S. 294 (1962).
PhiladelphiaNat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at

27

Id. at 366.

28

Id. at 371.

29

RIcHARD A. PoSNER, ANTITRUST LAw:

AN ECoNOMIc PERSPEcTvE

3-4 (1978).

See Merger Guidelines, supra note 23;
Robinson2, supra note 3.
30

See supra, notes 22-28 and
accompanying text (discussing Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank); Robinson2, supra note 3.
31

32

Robinson2, supra note 3.

33

Id.

34

Camire, supra note 12.

F.Supp. 1066 (D.D.C.1997)(finding that the
merged firm would be able to raise prices,
because only one "office superstore" would
remain in regional markets.) Eastman Kodak
and Staples arguably show respective
companies as "category killers" in the sense
Martin Mayer uses that term to describe
financial institutions of the future.
A crony of Thomas Jefferson
complained that American banking was
"only a fraud whereby labour suffers the
imposition of paying an interest on a
circulating medium," and, later, "[W]e
recognize three political beasts...
hierarchical and feudal aristocracy, to say the
worst of them, are now the instruments of
the third - viz., of banks." GEORGE S. EccLEs,
Ti PoLmcs OF BANKING 10 (Sidney Hyman
ed.) (1982).
36

Senator Thomas Hart Benson
apparently represented the views of his
constituents when he said about banks that
"All the flourishing cities of the West are
mortgaged to this money power. They may
be devoured by it at any moment." Id.
37

One commentator says that in the
early days of the Republic the performance
of banks "imposed enormous hardships on
both farmers and workingmen, and fed a
populist backlash which set back the
development of the nation's banking
industry by more than 50 years." VAUGHAN &
HILL, BANKING ON THE BRINK 1 (1992)
[hereinafter VAUGHAN & HILL]. In particular,
Vaughan and Hill suggest that bad policy
was caused by politicians who were
"demagogues and hypocrites" who had "a
peculiarly American genius for getting the
details of banking wrong (and then dressing
up the result as if it were a triumph for the
38

See Lawrence A. Sullivan, PostChicagoEconomics: Economists, Lawyers,
Judges, and Enforcement Officials in a Less
DeterminateTheoretical World, 63
ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 669 (1995). Some
antitrust subject areas involving
anticompetitive conduct have resisted
efficiency based economic analysis. See id.
Sullivan offers as an example cases where a
company leverages power in one market
(like copy machines) into another (like copy
machine repair). See id. (citing Eastman Kodak
v. Image Technical Services, 112 S.Ct. 2072
(1992)); see also FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970
3
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common man) ....

"

Demagoguery "soon led

to the destruction of the Bank of the United
States - an early form of central bank that
might later have served to check abuses and
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impose standards."
39
See JAMs L. PIERcE, TiE FUTURE OF
BANKNG, 33-34 (1991) [hereinafter PIERCE].

See id. at 36. East v. West rivalries in
banking matters were still important at the
end of the 19th century when an intense
Western populist versus Eastern banker - big
government battle raged over tight control of
money supply. The populist view favored
easy coinage of silver, while big banking/
government interests favored a tight money
standard based on scarce gold. That issue
was colorfully addressed in the famous
William Jennings Bryan "cross of gold"
speech. (A commentator on Public
Broadcasting's evening News Hour for
February 26, 1998 used clips of the Judy
Garland movie to demonstrate that Frank
Baum's Wizard of Oz is a colorful parable of
the "easy money" silver interests petitioning
the powerful gold standard proponents just
before the turn of the century.)
40

41

See id. at 40-41.

42

See id. at 43-45.

See e.g. Don Allen Resnikoff,
UnderstandingBank Regulations, 6 Loy.
CONSUMER L.R. 108 (1994).
43

See id.
See ROBERT E. LrrAN, WHAT SHOULD
BANKS Do? 27-28 (1987).
4

46

Id.

See Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(E)(i)
(1994) (forbidding the FDIC from taking
"any action ... with respect to any insured
depository institution that would have the
effect of increasing losses to any insurance
47
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fund...").
Federal insurance protecting
individual bank deposit accounts has been a
key feature of the United States bank
regulatory scheme since the Great
Depression. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C.A. § 811 et. seq.
(providing "[tihere is created a Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation... which
shall insure... the deposits of all banks and
savings associations which are entitled to the
benefits of insurance under this chapter
[Chapter 161. .. ."). Bank, savings
institution, and credit union accounts all
benefit from similar insurance. The quidpro-quo for banks is government regulation
of banking that in some ways has recently
become more restrictive. For example, in
1991 Congress enacted the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvements Act
(FDICIA), a system of early regulatory
intervention in the operation of banks with
insufficient capital, intended to reduce the
cost of failures to the FDIC.
4

See Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(E)(i)
(1994).
49

"Here is a thumbnail sketch of the
economic problems in Asia that will soon
take a bite out of our economy. Bank loans
to Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia,
Philippines and Thailand total the following:
from banks in the United States, nearly $24
billion .... They can't pay those bank loans.
That's why the big push to nail [American]
taxpayers for money for the International
Monetary Fund. The way this scam works is
this: Congress taxes us. Congress gives our
tax dollars to the IMF. The IMF gives it to
countries. Countries give it to banks. What's
missing in this scam? Any benefit at all to the
taxpayers who are putting up the dough?
Did we get any benefit from the loans made
by New York banks to folks in Asia? No.
Did we earn any of the profits from the
50
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interest charged those folks in Asia? No."
Charley Reese, When the Elite Talk in Group
Terms, Hang on to Your Wallet, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, February 15, 1998.
See Winston Williams, U.S. Puts
Together $7.5 Billion in Aid for Illinois Bank,
The N.Y. TIms, May 18,1984.

Of course, many small savings and
loans and commercial banks were also bailed
out by the U.S. Government.
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See

MAYER,

supranote 14, at 260.

51

See Kathleen Day & John M. Berry,
FDICRescues Texas Bank With $1 Billion Loan,
WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 18,1988.
52

See MAYER, supra note 14.
M4

1998

See VAUGHAN & HILL, supra note 38.

"Too big to fail" policies are one
example involving a public issue where
hostility toward large financial institutions is
brought into play ATM surcharges and
other bank fees have, for another example,
drawn the ire of Public Citizen and other
consumer groups, and have been the subject
of state laws and bills proposed to Congress.
57
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See

VAUGHN

& HILL, supra note 38.
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